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THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN JAPAN

I. Introduction

The Japan Communist Party (JCP), while numerically rather small in proportion to the population of Japan, is able through its influence in a variety of other organizations to exert a significant influence in Japanese public affairs. It is a legal party, contesting elections on both fational and local levels, although its success in electing its candidates has been minimal on the national level.

The JCP suffers from serious divisions in its own ranks, affecting the activities of the party itself and of some of the Communist-inflitrated mass organizations. Until the last year or two the party has been able to keep these disputes within party circles but more recently they have broken out into the open. A rival Communist party is being organized under the title of the Socialism Reform Movement and the most thoroughly Communist controlled front organization, the student federation ZENGAKUREN, while still Communist, has passed out of JCP control and now advocates ideas that are generally labelled "Trotskyist."

A majority of the Koreans living in Japan are members of CHOSEN SOREN, a Communist-controlled group, which serves as an instrument of the North Korean Labor Party rather than of the JCR

II. The Japan Communist Party Apparatus

Strongth

90-100,000

The leadership of the JCP consists of trained, sophisticated and dedicated Communists. The party aims at becoming a mass party with membership large enough to constitute a formidable political force but its success in this respect has been limited. A campaign in 1961 almost reached its goal of doubling party membership but it is believed that much of this increase was achieved by the conversion of active sympathiners into party members. The increase in membership was not reflected in voting strength during subsequent elections.

The membership of the JCP is drawn from intellectuals, industrial workers and peasants. The party recognizes that its failure to appeal successfully to the masses of the generally conservative peasantry is a weakness and it is working to remedy this.

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III. Propaganda Media

AKAHATA Official JCP newspaper.

126,000 (July 1961)

AKAHATA Sunday edition.

300,000 (July 1961)

ZENEI Theoretical journal.

28,000 (March 1960)

SEKAI SEIIJI SHIRYO

Journal of Foreign Communist Experience

11.000 (March 1960)

PAOBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM

Japanese edition

3,695 (March 1960)

The JCP also publishes a number of other periodicals designed for internal party guidance.

IV. Party Strength in Government

Diet

Lower house (1960) 1,156,723 votes (2.9%)

3 seats

Upper house (1962) 1,760,249 votes

4 seats

tocal constituencies 4.8% nat'l constituency 3.1%

Local government (1959)

Prefectural assemblies II
City assemblies 349
Town and village assemblies 565

V. The JCP and the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP)

The JSP is a strongly Marxist party. It includes a strong and radical left wing which advocates close cooperation with the JCP and which holds views on both domestic and foreign policy which are almost indistinguishable from those of the JCP. It is this left wing which tends to push the JSP into the adoption of policies parallel to those of the JCP rather than actual JCP penetrations. It is, of course, impossible to say how many of these extreme leftwingers are really secret Communists.

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VI. The JCP and Mass Organizations

The JCP devotes a vigorous effort to the task of infiltrating and influencing mass organizations in every possible field in which public interest can be aroused. Few of these organizations in Japan can be called Communist fronts in the sense that they are under thorough Communist control. Almost all of them, however, are infiltrated and influenced to some degree. Most completely controlled are the Democratic Youth League and the student organization MINDEIDO, some individual trade unions within the national federation (SOHYO) and, until recently, the Anti A-and-H Bomb organization and the peace movement. JCP efforts to control these last have been hampered by Socialist competition.

A partial list of the more important Communist-penetrated mass organisations follows.

A. ZENGAKUREN (All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Associations)

Membership
249,775
166 of 2182 officers are Communists
The Central Executive Committee is almost entirely
Communist.

ZENGAKUREN is the most important student organization in Japan. It was formerly JCP-controlled with most of its top leaders being JCP members. These youth leaders, however, disagreed with the JCP policy of legal struggle and united front. Dissension came to a head in 1958 and a number of ZENGAKUREN leaders were expelled from the JCP. ZENGAKUREN is now independent of JCP control, under some Trotskylte influence and highly militant. It is capable of organizing civit disturbances among youth and students and has done so in connection with such issues as the mutual security treaty and the Police Powers Bitt.

B. MINSEIDO (Democratic Youth League)

Strength (est.) 70,000

About 10,000 are also members of the JCP.

The 47-man Central Committee is composed entirely of JCP members.

-Affiliate of World Federation of Democratic Youth?



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MINSEIDO was originally formed in 1922, but was inactive for some time during the 1950's. After ZENGAKUREN broke away from JCP control, the party directed MINSEIDO to take over part of student front activity. Membership before 1958 was about 3,000. Emphasis at present is on recruiting and organization. Its target is 300,000 members in the next two years.

C. SOHYO (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan)

Claimed membership
Affiliated unions

3,970,000

59

In spite of a considerable number of JCP members scattered throughout both the rank and file and the leadership, SOHYO cannot be considered as under JCP control. It has, during the past year been moving away from Communist-inspired political activity toward a greater emphasis on normal trade union economic activity. Some affiliated unions, however, are strongly Communist influenced. Most strongly influenced are ZENKENRO (All Construction Ministry Workers Union), ZENKOWAN (All Japan Dock Workers Union), and Zennichijire (All-Japan Day Workers Union), all of which are affiliated with Trade Union Internationals of the World Federation of Trade Unions. SOHYO representatives have been active participants at international WFTU meetings, although the federation is not an affiliate.

D. Women's Democratic Club

Strength 1400 8 of 34 central officers are members of the JCP. About 10% of the membership are members of the JCP.

The Women's Democratic Club is not large, but it is strongly Communist influenced and active. It plays a leading part in the much larger national women's federation, through which it exercises an influence out of proportion to its numbers.

E. All-Japan Federation of Women's Organizations

Membership
1,042,793 (1960)
44 affiliated organizations. (not all Communist-penetrated)
5 of 34 central officers are JCP members.
Affiliate of Women's International Democratic Federation.

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This organization carries on a wide variety of activities of a welfare and educational nature among Japanese women. It seeks to encourage them to an active part in civic life. As might be expected, it strongly supports the peace movement, disarmament, and the campaigns to ban nuclear bombs and tests.

- F. ZENNICHINO (Federation of All-Japan Farmer's Unions)

Membership 250, 000
14% of central headquarters functionaries are JCP members (1959)

JCP control of ZENNICHINO is fairly strong, but the organisation has not had a great impact on the Japanese peasantry. The organisation endeavors to appeal to the peasants on economic issues, such as farm prices, and food imports.

G. Japan Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee

Individual members 346
Organizational members 18

Of 30 Standing Directors 5 are known JCP members. Others are identified as sympathizers.

The Afro-Asian movement, designed by the Communist movement to foment anti-colonialism and wars of liberation and concerned chiefly with the problems of under-developed countries has not had as wide an appeal in independent, industrialised Japan as in some other Asian countries.

H. Japan-Soviet Society

Membership
462 are JCP members.

17.000

The JSS was organized to replace the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association when the latter became too well known as a Communist front. Efforts have been made to play down the JCP role in the JSS, nevertheless the entire secretariat is composed of JCP members.

I. Japan Peace Committee

Membership
49 prefectural committees.

9.350



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Of 43 Standing Directors, 17 are JCP members. 9 others have been reported as party members.

Member organization of the World Peace Council

The Japan Peace Committee is one of several organizations through which the JCP mebilizes mass support for the Communist peace and disarmament movement. The peace ideal has wide appeal among the Japanese people, but the resolutions and programs of the Peace Committee are inspired by the JCP and always single out the American imperialists as the obstacle to peace, while absolving the Soviet Union from any blame. This obvious Communist slant has aroused opposition within the Japan peace movement and there are efforts going forward to wrest control of it away from the JCP.

J. GENSUIKYO (Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombe)

Membership 89,806 (1959) 22 of its officers are JCP members.

GENSUIKYO is an offshoot of the peace movement, designed to capitalise on the Japanese people's experience of and revulsion against nuclear weapons. It naturally calls forth a wide response. The speeches and resolutions at its annual Congress, however, are directed exclusively against American bombs. This siant has aroused opposition and the Japanese Socialist Party has been attempting to take over control of GENSUIKYO. A JSP resolution at the August 1962 Congress which criticised Soviet tests as well as American was defeated after a bitter debate and the JSP delegates walked out. The impact of this rebellion on GENSUIKYO is not yet clear, but its effectiveness as a Communist propaganda instrument may have been damaged.

VII. International Ties

The JCP through most of its history has been Soviet-oriented. The adoption of a more militant program in 1950 was the result of criticism by the Cominform and when, in 1956, the Soviets formulated the policy of peaceful coexistence, the JCP dutifully returned to legal struggle and respectability. CPSU representatives attend JCP congresses and exercise a voice in the formulation of JCP programs.

Since the establishment of the Communist regime in mainland China, geographical proximity, racial affinity and admiration for the achievements

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of the Chinese Communists have led the JCP to close contacts with the CCP in spite of the fact that the Chinese revolutionary experience in an underdeveloped country is not exactly appropriate for industrialised Japan.

The Japanese Communists' ties with, and acceptance of generous financial support from, both centers of the international movement created no serious problems for the party until the Sino-Soviet dispute broke into the open. Since then the JCP has been torn with dissension over its policy, endeavoring to avoid an outright commitment, and to promote a Sino-Soviet accord. At the same time the JCP has seen an increase in the strength of its pro-Chinese faction. The Soviets have viewed this trend with concern and have been working, both in the party and in left-wing non-Communist circles, to build a force which can resist this drift toward the Chinese.

VIII. The Socialism Reform Movement (SRM)

In mid-1961 there was a dispute over the draft program for the 8th JCP Congress. The actions of the party leadership in silencing its opposition, and rigging the election of its own supporters as Congress delegates brought an open break in the party. A group of dissident Central Committee members, followed by others from lower echeions; publicly denounced the program and the leaders and resigned from the party. The dissident group then set up the Socialism Reform Movement and began publication of a magazine, Atarashii Rosen, to propagate its views. Dissension immediately developed within this group, principally as to whether it should be constituted as a rival Communist Party or act. Accurate figures of the membership of the SRM are not available, but their claim of 2-3,000 is probably exaggerated.

The relationship between this split in the JCP and the Sino-Soviet dispute is not clear. Both the leaders of the JCP and the expelled dissidents appeal to the principles of the 81-party Statement and the Moscow Deciaration in support of their positions and both claim to be the correct interpreters of Soviet Marxism-Leninism in Japan.

IX. Minorities

A. CHOSEN SOREN (Federation of Koreans Residing in Japan)

Of about 600,000 Koreans now residing in Japan 150,000 to 170,000 are members of the Communist controlled CHOSEN SOREN. This

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Communist control comes from the North Korean Labor Party, however, rather than from the JCP. CHOSEN SOREN works to tie the Koreans in Japan to the Communist regime in North Korea and to alienate them from the Republic of Korea in the south. Members have carried on political action and espionage operations against South Korea and have engaged in espionage against American installations in Japan. It has not carried out operations against the Japanese government nor participated actively in internal Japanese politics. It played a leading role in initiating and organizing the repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea.

B. Overseas Chinese

The estimated 59, 900 overseas Chinese in Japan are for the most part apolitical and without any great attachment to either the Communist regime on the mainland or the Nationalists on Taiwan. The principal organization of these Chinese is the Tokyo Cverseas Chinese Association which has about 1,800 members. Individual Chinese and Chinese business firms provide contacts, cover and support for Chinese Communist activities and work to convert other Chinese, but there is no evidence that the Chinese community or organizations such as the Tokyo Association are being used for broader subversive purposes. The Chinese Communists appear to depend upon the JCP and other left-wing Japanese it can influence to promote their political and economic objectives in Japan.



X. Objectives and Tactics

The Japan Communist Party (JCP), with a membership of only 100,000 in a nation of 93,000,000, cannot include among its objectives for the foresecable future its accession to power either by a violent uprising or by an electoral victory. Nor is its relationship to the ruling Liberal-Democratic party such that it can expect any significant influence in Japanese affairs through any form of collaboration with the regime.

Faced with these conditions the JCP, with typical Communist flexibility has undertaken to organize and lead a united opposition to the government. This tactic, if successful, would enable the party to exert strong pressures upon the government and could conceivably lead to Communist participation in a coalition government following a united front victory in a general election.

The JCP has sought to organize such a united front through a formal alliance with the major opposition party, the Japanese Socialists. The Japanese Socialist Party, (JSP) although itself faithful to Marxism and sensitive to any charge that it deviates from Marxist principles, has consistently rejected these proposals, even over the violent opposition of its own influential left wing.

At a lower level, under the concept of unity of action, the JCP has since 1955 had considerably more success. The party has selzed upon issues where the interests of the Communist program and of Soviet foreign policy run nearly parallel with the genuine feelings of a section of the Japanese public. In exploiting such issues the party has been able to mobilize considerable mass support for its wews from non-Communist - groups, especially the Socialists, labor, and youth and stidents. Questions which have been most vigorously exploited in the Communist interest are the security treaty with the United States, particularly the presence of American bases in Japan, defense of the constitutional renunciation of war, resistance to the etrengthening of police powers to deal with subversion, disarmament, and nuclear weapons and tests. In these campaigns mass * pressure upon the government, influenced if not generated by Communist activity, has forced the postponing of serious consideration of constitutional revision to permit the maintenance of armed forces and the strengthening of police powers, but it has not been able to alter the basic Japanese anti-Communist alignment. While the Japanese government would probably support equitable general disarmament and the banning of nuclear

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weapons spontaneously, Communist supported public opposition has severely limited its freedom of maneuver on these questions. Communist tactical successes on some of these issues have not however been reflected

in significant gains in Communist and leftist voting strength.

In the past year or two:the JCP efforts to lead the united opposition have met with some setbacks. The Japanese Socialist party leaders have become more aware of and more concerned about Communist influence within the party's ranks. The joint statements issued by some JSP personalities and Chinese Communist leaders condemning the United States as the principal enemy of peace and of Japan have stirred strong opposition within the JSP. SOHYO (The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), has been strongly influenced by the JCP and has cooperated but never affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions. Recently some of its leaders have become aware of Communist exploitation of labor for political purposes and have adopted a program calling for concentration upon economic rather than political questions. Many erstwhile supporters of the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (GENSUIKYO) and the Japan Peace Movement, both largely the creation of Communists, have come to understand and resent the exclusively pro-Soviet and anti-American slant of these organizations and the growing Communist effort to inject other political issues into their proceedings. Serious rebellions against Communist control are going on in both.

The JCP has been hampered in extending its influence by serious divisions within its own ranks concerning the correctness and the implications of the party program. These divisions in some respects parallel and have been stimulated by the conflicts lately apparent within the international Communist movement although they were not created as a result of those conflicts. The extreme left wing has doubted the effectiveness of concessions made to potential allies in the legal struggle and in its united front and has urged more militant tactics. While the party leadership or "mainstream" has held to the Soviet view that a direct attack upon Japanese capitalism must await the expulsion of the American imperialists, dissident groups have argued that the principal enemy is Japanese monopoly capitalism and that its destruction will be automatically followed by the departure of the Americans. Struggles over these questions have seriously damaged party unity.



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Control of the Communist-front All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Associations (ZENGAKUREN) was taken over by dissident elements in 1958. These extremist students were largely responsible for the violent demonstrations against President Eisenhower's visit to Japan in 1960. The party leadership had decided against such tactics on this occasion but was compelled to go along after ZENGAKUREN forced its hand.

More recently a group of JCP leaders, some from the Central Committee, broke with the party over the treatment of these questions in the party program and over the steamroller tactics of the leadership in forcing the program through the 8th Party Congress. These dissidents resigned or were expelled and are now engaged in an attempt to put together a new party. Their views are very similar to those expressed since 1960 by the Communist Party of Italy.

- Division within the party is further stimulated by Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence, as the party leaders show signs of shifting from their previous uncritical pro-Soviet orientation to a more pro-Chinese position. In the past two years the JCP's effectiveness as a political force has been weakened by this disunity whenever Sino-Soviet divergencies have been sharp and apparent.